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Arizona’s Torres v. Terrell and Section 318.03: The Wild
West of Pre-Embryo Disposition
CATHERINE WHEATLEY*
INTRODUCTION
A husband and wife, reeling from the wife’s cancer diagnosis, decide to undergo
in vitro fertilization (IVF). Cancer treatment will make her infertile, unless steps are
taken now, so they undergo egg retrieval and cryopreserve the resulting pre-embryos.
As the couple fills out the clinic’s paperwork, they initial a standard pre-embryo
disposition clause. The wife survives, but the marriage does not. In divorce
proceedings, the court dissolves their relationship and divides their property—and
must decree whether the frozen pre-embryos should go to the wife, who wants to
have them transferred to her uterus, or the husband, who no longer wants biological
children and would like to destroy them. Based on prior decisions from around the
country, there are strong arguments in favor of each spouse. And yet, this court
chooses an entirely different path: the frozen pre-embryos will go to a completely
unknown third party.
This is exactly what happened in a recent Arizona case, Torres v. Terrell. The
Arizona trial court took the quintessential Solomonic approach to judicial decisionmaking to a new extreme when it held that a divorcing couple with cryopreserved
pre-embryos must donate their cryopreserved pre-embryos to a third party.1 On the
heels of Torres, the Arizona legislature then passed a related law, title 25, section
318.03 of the Arizona Code, specifying that when divorcing spouses disagree on preembryo disposition, courts should award the pre-embryos to whichever spouse will
“provide[] the best chance for the in vitro human embryos to develop to birth.”2
While the statute may give cryopreserved pre-embryos—frozen, undifferentiated
genetic material only a few days old—a slight chance at life, it sacrifices substantial
individual interests.
Arizona’s recent lawmaking on pre-embryo disposition promises far reaching
legal and policy ramifications. Assisted reproductive technology (ART), a series of
medical procedures that create cryopreserved pre-embryos, is an industry worth an
estimated $4.5 billion3 and helps to conceive about 1.5% of U.S. babies born
annually.4 Over 300 fertility clinics in the United States assist tens of thousands of
couples who seek fertility treatment every year, resulting in what could be more than
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1. See infra Section II.A.
2. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018).
3. Indlieb Farazi, The Price of Life: Treating Infertility, AL JAZEERA (June 3, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/05/price-life-treating-infertility
-160524081956257.html [https://perma.cc/5T4V-B4R3].
4. Jen Christensen, Record Number of Women Using IVF to Get Pregnant, CNN (Feb.
18, 2014, 2:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/health/record-ivf
-use/index.html [https://perma.cc/SSV7-6JRD].
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one million frozen pre-embryos in storage.5 At the same time, the debate about when
life begins continues to fuel some of the most contentious contemporary political
issues.6 Thus, if the Torres ruling and section 318.03 come to be considered settled
law, it would likely result in a sea change in other areas that implicate a view of
embryonic personhood like abortion jurisprudence.7 An intermediate appeals court
recently vacated the Torres trial court’s order8, and the parties have appealed to the
Arizona Supreme Court.9 Section 318.03 has yet to be adjudicated although
constitutional challenges seem likely. 10 However, even if both the trial court ruling
and statute are definitively rejected, they nonetheless highlight a stark reality about
ART: so far, legal innovations have not kept pace with medical innovations. 11
In this Note, Part I examines the three main approaches used in other state
supreme court decisions to decide pre-embryo disposition disputes, as well as three
perspectives on the legal status of the pre-embryo, and compares them with
Arizona’s emerging law. Part II summarizes Arizona’s Torres trial court order and
opinion and section 318.03. Part III then analyzes whether the Torres orders and
Arizona’s new statutory “most likely to lead to birth standard”12 present
constitutional issues and concludes that the trial court’s order, if reinstated by the
Arizona Supreme Court, and section 318.03 can be challenged on substantive due
process and equal protection grounds. Finally, this Note concludes that, because the
initial Torres ruling and section 318.03 create significant legal and policy concerns,
in addition to constitutional concerns, patients considering IVF in Arizona should be
very cautious.
Before getting into the substance of the Note, it is necessary to understand the
technology involved. First, pre-embryos are created through ART, namely, a
procedure called in vitro fertilization. In IVF, an egg and sperm are combined outside
of the body to form a pre-embryo, which is then transferred to a woman’s uterus. If
the pre-embryo implants, a woman becomes pregnant.13 For thirty years, patients

5. Jody Lyneé Madeira, “Eggs”ploding the Boundaries of Contract Law?: Current
Perspectives on Embryos and Genetic Material upon Progenitors’ Divorce 5 (Oct. 2015)
(citation omitted) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
6. John Ehrenreich, Why the Abortion Debate Feels Like Such a Stalemate, SLATE (Aug.
1, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/08/why-the-abortion-debate-feels-like
-such-a-stalemate.html [https://perma.cc/L3ZE-GHTN].
7. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Arizona Embryo Law Could Alter Abortion Debate,
PRESS HERALD (July 17, 2018), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/07/17/arizona-embryo
-law-could-alter-abortion-debate/ [https://perma.cc/ECQ6-VKRY] (“If a days-old embryo in
a freezer has a right to life, why not a days-old embryo in utero?”).
8. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019) , review granted in part, CV19-0106-PR, 2019 Ariz. LEXIS 226 (Ariz. Aug. 27, 2019).
9. Id.
10. See Gary A. Debele & Susan L. Crockin, Legal Issues Surrounding Embryos and
Gametes: What Family Law Practitioners Need to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 55, 106 (2018).
11. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved
Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 181
(2004).
12. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018).
13. See, e.g., In Vitro Fertilization, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests
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have been able to cryopreserve, or freeze, any surplus pre-embryos that are not
transferred.14 Because egg retrieval is expensive and invasive, and less than half of
all transfers result in live births,15 cryopreservation allows patients to undergo IVF
once and use the resulting pre-embryos in subsequent cycles, thus avoiding repeated
retrievals.16
To avoid inaccuracy, this Note uses the word “pre-embryo” throughout.
Depending upon how many days after fertilization transfer or cryopreservation
occurs (usually two to five days), “pre-embryo” describes the fertilized egg that
ranges in development from a four-to-eight-cell organism to a blastocyst with
hundreds of cells, ripe for implantation.17 At any point past the blastocyst stage, the
embryo’s next generation of development is wholly dependent upon interaction with
the uterus.18 Thus, cryopreservation must occur at an earlier stage of development,
before the pre-embryo is ready to implant and this critical interaction with the uterus
takes place; in other words, before the pre-embryo becomes an embryo.19 This
scientific distinction, observed here and causing the Davis v. Davis court,
adjudicating an early pre-disposition dispute, to conclude that “[i]t is for this reason
that it is appropriate to refer to the developing entity up to this point as a preembryo,
rather than an embryo,”20 is nonetheless not universally followed in legal contexts,
including statutory law.21 The use of “pre-embryo” here only reflects a desire for
accuracy and is not meant to imply that pre-embryos do not have a special potential.
This Note also uses the term “gamete providers” to describe the individuals who
provide the egg and sperm that form the pre-embryo. Finally, “pre-embryo donation”
refers to the process by which gamete providers donate their surplus pre-embryos to
a third party,22 essentially providing the opportunity for a woman to “give birth to an
‘adopted’ child.”23

-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716 [https://perma.cc/P9DF-A42N].
14. See COMM. TO CONSIDER SOC., ETHICAL & LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION, STATE OF VICTORIA, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 11–12 (1984) [hereinafter STATE OF VICTORIA].
15. NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, 2015
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 44 (2017). Success rates
differ substantially by age. For instance, for transfers of fresh nondonor eggs, the rate of live
birth is 46.5% for women under thirty-five while at thirty-seven and forty, the rates are 38.4%
and 27.4%, respectively. Id. at 5. For the same ages, the respective rates of live births are
48.7%, 44.5%, and 40% for frozen transfers. Id.
16. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1259 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Kindregan
& McBrien, supra note 11, at 171 & n.5.
17. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (citing the American Fertility
Society); Sarah A. Weber, Dismantling the Dictated Moral Code: Modifying Louisiana's In
Vitro Fertilization Statutes to Protect Patients’ Procreative Liberty, 51 LOY. L. REV. 549, 551
n.3 (2005).
18. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594.
19. See id.
20. Id. (quoting the American Fertility Society) (emphasis omitted).
21. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018).
22. See Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 172.
23. Id.
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I. THREE APPROACHES TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRE-EMBRYOS AND PRE-EMBRYO
DISPOSITION DISPUTES
Torres and section 318.03 came to life against a backdrop of pre-embryo
dissolution disputes in other states over the past thirty years that have considered
several issues, including the pre-embryo’s legal status and which doctrinal approach
should resolve the dispute.24 Pre-embryo disposition jurisprudence in the United
States shows three main perspectives on the legal status of pre-embryos25 and three
main doctrinal approaches.26
A. The Legal Status of Pre-Embryos
Courts adjudicating pre-embryo dissolution disputes have employed three
different perspectives on the legal status of pre-embryos: (1) pre-embryos as
property, (2) pre-embryos as people, and (3) pre-embryos as potential person.27
1. Pre-Embryos as Property
Several states employ a pre-embryos-as-property approach, which is also
supported by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM). 28 Property
as a legal concept is a bundle of rights that includes control, possession, use,
exclusion, profit, and disposition.29 Under this approach, pre-embryos are the
property of their gamete providers,30 and so their destruction and use depends
completely upon the gamete providers’ consent.31 This approach was applied in York
v. Jones, when a couple sued a fertility clinic after it refused to release their preembryos.32 Denying the fertility clinic’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the
clinic was acting as the bailee of the frozen pre-embryos and must return them to
their gamete providers.33
The pre-embryos as property approach is criticized because, in other doctrinal
areas, courts have found that people do not have property rights in their excised
tissues. For instance, in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, after
Moore’s spleen was removed during treatment for hairy cell leukemia, doctors
learned it was valuable and created a cell line (i.e. a culture of cells) without

24. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
25. Cf. id. at 597.
26. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003).
27. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
28. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); Kindregan & McBrien,
supra note 11, at 186.
29. Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 73, 75 (1995); see Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 186.
30. Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 186.
31. Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, “Unwanted, Anonymous, Biological Descendants”:
Mandatory Donation Laws and Laws Prohibiting Preembryo Discard Violate the
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 183, 195 (1993).
32. York, 717 F. Supp. at 424.
33. Id. at 425, 429.
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informing Moore.34 Moore sued his treatment team and the hospital on the grounds
that he had a property interest in the cell line, but the California Supreme Court found
that he did not have an interest because he did not have a property right in his spleen
after its removal.35 However, some scholars argue that allowing a property right in
body parts—or specifically, reproductive matter—simply means acknowledging that
responsibility for pre-embryos as property is “a complex bundle of rights, duties,
powers and immunities.”36 Under this view, “the pruning away of some or a great
many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title.” 37 Regardless, viewing
pre-embryo disposition through a property lens is complicated because both gamete
providers have equal ownership interests in the pre-embryos.38
Critics also say that the pre-embryo-as-property approach marginalizes its life
potential because likening a pre-embryo to inanimate objects is demeaning to the
pre-embryo.39 This is largely a semantic distinction, however, because even critics
of the approach may still agree in the end that decision-making authority rests with
the gamete providers.40
While the Torres trial court engaged in a discussion of whether the pre-embryo is
a person under law, the court of appeals avoided any overt mention of this analysis.
But, its view on the status of pre-embryos is suggested by a footnote that reads: “In
this case, the parties treated the embryos as joint property pursuant to statute, see
A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (authorizing the court in a dissolution proceeding to divide
property held in common equitably, though not necessarily in kind), although they
could have simply brought a contract action.”41 The fact that the court identifies the
analysis as being one of property division while also pointing out that it could have
been resolved as an ordinary contract action is most suggestive of a pre-embryos-as
property-approach.
2. Pre-Embryos as People
To date, Louisiana is the only state to explicitly adopt a pre-embryos-as-people
approach.42 This approach views pre-embryos as genetically unique and therefore
entitled to full legal rights as persons under the law.43 A 1986 Louisiana statute

34. 793 P.2d 479, 480–81 (Cal. 1990).
35. Id. at 489. Of course, the California Supreme Court was concerned in part with the
policy implications for medical research and organ donation, see id. at 487, and the policy
interests of pre-embryo disposition are likely different.
36. E.g., Brown, supra note 29, at 75 (quoting People v. Walker, 90 P.2d. 854, 855 (Cal.
App. 1939)). “[E]ven the possessor of contraband has certain property rights in it against
anyone other than the state.” (citing Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509–10
(Cal. 1990)).
37. Id. (quoting People v. Walker, 90 P.2d. 854, 855 (Cal. App. 1939)).
38. Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 11, at 185.
39. Brown, supra note 31, at 197.
40. Id.; Weber, supra note 17, at 563.
41. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 684 n.2 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019).
42. Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and
Proposed State Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 412 (2013).
43. See Weber, supra note 17, at 562.
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establishes that a pre-embryo is a “juridical person”44 and a “biological human
being.”45 Because Louisiana asserts that personhood begins at conception, it
prohibits the destruction of pre-embryos and pre-embryonic research. 46 Using a “best
interest of the [pre-embryo]” standard,47 Louisiana also mandates donation if gamete
providers give up their parental rights.48
New Mexico has a similar statute, enacted in 1985, but stops short of stating that
a pre-embryo is a person. Instead, New Mexico requires that all pre-embryos created
through IVF must be transferred.49 Remarkably, neither Louisiana’s nor New
Mexico’s statutes have been challenged. 50
Elsewhere, personhood bills, though largely unsuccessful, continue to be
proposed in state and federal legislatures. For instance, in the five years between
2013 and 2018, over one hundred personhood bills were proposed by state
legislators.51 Congress last considered a personhood bill expanding the legal
definition of a person in January of 2017.52 The bill, titled the “Sanctity of Human
Life Act,” provided that life begins at fertilization. 53 However, outside of Louisiana,
federal and state personhood bills have consistently failed.54
According to scholars, scientists, and jurists, treating pre-embryos as people is
deeply problematic because it ignores the scientific fact that pre-embryos are
developmentally distinct from persons who are fully protected under the law.55 This
critique largely rests on the fact that pre-embryos, at such an undeveloped stage, are
small groups of undifferentiated cells that are incomparable with a developed fetus
or baby.56 When cryopreservation is performed, for instance, a pre-embryo does not
have a central nervous system, a brain or any other organs, or the ability to feel pain. 57
These characteristics, requisite for life, cannot develop until implantation. 58
In addition, critics note that pre-embryos only have a five–to–eight–percent
chance of survival59 and most often stop developing naturally, which is widely
considered a cellular loss, not a death.60 Finally, critics point out that multiple forms

44. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (1986).
45. Id. § 9:126.
46. Id. § 9:129.
47. Id. § 9:131.
48. Id. § 9:130.
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1 (2007).
50. Howell, supra note 42, at 413.
51. Legislative
Tracker:
Personhood,
REWIRE.NEWS
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/personhood/
[https://perma.cc/VYB7WYUN].
52. See Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 586, 115th Cong. (2017).
53. Id. § 2.
54. See Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood's Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side
Effects on Women's Health, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75, 77 (2013).
55. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 31, at 195.
56. See id. at 222.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Howell, supra note 42, at 413; Weber, supra note 17, at 564–65.
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of birth control are legally used to destroy “pre-embryos” in the body.61 For instance,
Plan B, a popular birth control, prevents a fertilized ovum from implanting. 62 This
causes commentators to question why IVF pre-embryos should be granted legal
protections that exceed those granted to corporal “pre-embryos.” 63 In fact, in many
other contexts, the legal system has largely rejected the extension of all laws to
fetuses, which are significantly more developed than pre-embryos.64 Finally, critics
argue that such an approach violates the privacy doctrine established by the U.S.
Supreme Court,65 an idea that will be explored more fully in Part III.
While Arizona stops short of explicitly granting pre-embryos personhood, the
Torres trial court ruling and section 318.03 implicate a pre-embryo-as-people
perspective. Courts that do not employ this view balance only the gamete providers’
interests against each other.66 However, the trial court’s reasoning elevates the preembryo’s interests over the rights of either gamete provider, and section 318.03
grants the state’s perception of the pre-embryo’s interests more weight than those of
the spouse favoring destruction. The only reason why a state would take that
approach, especially given that a state’s typical interest in marriage dissolution is to
give spouses the cleanest separation possible, is to further the premise that preembryos are entitled to the same protections as other lives in being.
3. Pre-Embryo as Potential Person
The most common of the three approaches to embryo disposition is pre-embryoas-potential-person, which accords pre-embryos special status because of their
potential to develop into humans but does not grant them personhood.67 This
approach was used in deciding such key pre-embryo disposition cases as Davis v.
Davis68 and A.Z. v. B.Z.,69 as well as by multiple advisory boards, including the U.S.
Ethics Advisory Board.70
In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court did not consider pre-embryos persons
because they have not implanted, are not viable, and have not been born.71 The Davis
court did not consider the pre-embryos property out of concern that this approach
was demeaning,72 but instead created a middle ground: “special respect because of

61. Howell, supra note 42, at 413.
62. How Plan B Works, PLAN B ONE-STEP, https://www.planbonestep.com/how-plan-b
-works/ [https://perma.cc/ZGC8-4PFK].
63. Howell, supra note 42, at 413.
64. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to a fetus).
65. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 17, at 584.
66. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001). One question of interest, albeit
one not addressed here, is whether such courts ignore pre-embryos’ interests or merely
consider them only insofar as those interests are conflated with those of their gamete providers.
67. See Brown, supra note 31, at 198.
68. See 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
69. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000).
70. See Brown, supra note 31, at 197–98.
71. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594–95 (Tenn. 1992).
72. See id. at 595.
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their potential for human life.”73 Using this approach, the Davis court gave the
gamete provider who wanted to avoid genetic parenthood the right to choose the preembryos’ disposition.74 In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed with
the Davis court on this approach because it allowed courts to avoid applying laws
involving child custody and personal property, which it considered inapposite areas
of law.75
Critics of the “special respect” approach argue it lacks utility because it does not
dictate an outcome, and pre-embryos should either have rights or should not.76 Critics
also deem this approach vague and fear it may lean too far toward giving preembryos personhood, which would be inaccurate since, scientifically, life has not yet
begun.77
In summary, despite multiple rulings, the legal status of pre-embryos remains
unsettled. It will remain so until the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari to a preembryo case. Since the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that fetuses are
entitled to full legal rights,78 however, and since pre-embryos are radically less
developed than fetuses, the Court is not likely to find that pre-embryos are entitled
to legal personhood.
B. Approaches to Pre-Embryo Disposition Disputes
Defining a pre-embryo’s status is not enough; courts also must decide which
doctrinal approach to pre-embryo disposition cases to employ. There are three
different approaches here as well: (1) the contract approach, (2) the contemporaneous
agreement approach, and (3) the balancing test approach.79
1. The Contract Approach
The prevailing view takes a contract approach.80 Under this view, disposition
agreements entered into before IVF are enforceable if they do not violate public
policy.81 For instance, in 1992, the pre-embryo disposition agreement was “critical”
to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Davis, and the court
presumptively favored enforcing such agreements.82 While the court recognized that
parties’ feelings over personal decisions like pre-embryo disposition might change

73. Id. at 597.
74. Id. at 604.
75. See 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000).
76. Brown, supra note 31, at 199.
77. Id.
78. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
79. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003).
80. Id. at 776.
81. Id.
82. Tracy Haslett, Note, J.B v. M.B.: The Enforcement of Disposition Contracts and the
Competing Interests of the Right to Procreate and the Right Not to Procreate Where Donors
of Genetic Material Dispute the Disposition of Unused Preembryos, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 195, 203–04 (2001).
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over time, it held that absent any subsequent modifications, prior agreements should
hold.83
A few years later in Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of Appeals enforced a
consent form, signed by both gamete providers, that transferred possession of their
pre-embryos to the fertility clinic if the gamete providers could not agree on
disposition.84 The Kass court also ruled that pre-embryo disposition agreements
should be presumptively valid, and prioritized them because they “maximize
procreative liberty” by limiting the state’s involvement in decision-making, and
because they avoid litigation costs.85 Finally, the Kass court opined that this approach
encouraged parties to be deliberate in using IVF, to be deliberate in making related
decisions, and to take their consent seriously.86
More recent courts have also used this approach. In the 2002 case Litowitz v.
Litowitz, the Washington Supreme Court settled a disposition disagreement, relying
only on a cryopreservation agreement, by holding that under the contract terms the
pre-embryos should have been destroyed after five years.87 The court so held even
though the husband provided sperm and the wife did not provide gametes, specifying
that “[a]ny right [the wife] may have to the preembryos must be based solely upon
contract.”88
One problem with the contract approach is that the line between informed-consent
documents, disposition agreements, and contracts is blurry. Informed-consent
documents are primarily intended for education, disclosure, and recording consent. 89
In a contract, however, the parties exchange bargained-for promises. Conflating an
informed-consent document with a contract is problematic because it confuses who
is promising what to whom and because it is unclear to what extent consent and
disposition documents are contractual, and therefore binding on both parties,
especially if the agreements are merely boilerplate or contracts of adhesion. 90
Such agreements do not mutually affect outcomes, but merely reflect one party
specifying what will be done. The fact that patients are typically unable to bargain
for changes in standard consent forms suggests that treating the documents as armslength contracts is problematic, despite its prevalence.91 It is also unclear whether an
informed-consent document between a fertility patient and care provider should bind
a third party, even if it is a third-party spouse. For instance, in Torres, Torres was the
patient, but usually contracts will bind the “nonpatient” spouse who initialed as
well.92 Moreover, should Terrell’s initial on the agreement between Torres and the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
See 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 180.
Id.
48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
Id. at 262, 267.
JODY LYNEÉ MADEIRA, TAKING BABY STEPS: HOW PATIENTS AND FERTILITY CLINICS
COLLABORATE IN CONCEPTION 187 (2018).
90. See id. at 196.
91. See id.
92. See infra Part II.A.1; Rowlette v. Mortimer, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1024 (D. Idaho
2018) (considering whether giving a sperm sample makes someone a patient of a fertility
specialist).
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fertility clinic represent a binding agreement between he and Torres? To avoid these
questions, exclusive bilateral disposition contracts between the gamete providers (or
other prospective parents), representing their “dickered” bargain, would help lend
clarity to the parties’ wishes, follow them from clinic to clinic, and support the
contract approach to disposition disputes.
The Torres trial court flirted with a contract approach, although its treatment is
ambiguous. On the one hand, there is ample indication in the court’s explicit
reasoning that if the court had found the contract to be an unambiguous expression
of the parties’ intent, it would have honored that intent. 93 But, it is unclear whether
the trial court correctly concluded that the section H provision was ambiguous and
why the court then ultimately resolved the dispute with one of the selected options,
pre-embryo donation, if it was not following the contract.94 In contrast, the Torres
appeals court situates its analysis from a contracts approach, supplementing with a
balancing test when the agreement is ambiguous or when the agreement grants
decision-making authority to the courts.95
While both courts at least implicated the contract approach, section 318.03
indicates a legislative desire to override, not effectuate, the parties’ intent. The
relevant section reads, “[i]f an agreement between the spouses concerning the
disposition of the in vitro human embryos is brought before the court . . . the court
shall award the in vitro human embryos [to the spouse intending to give birth].” 96 In
addition, while the Litowitz court treated both the gamete-providing spouse and the
non-gamete-providing spouse as equals, 97 section 318.03 requires that if both
spouses “intend to allow the in vitro human embryos to develop to birth” but only
one spouse is a gamete provider, then the gamete-providing spouse will be awarded
the pre-embryos.98
In large part, the dispute over whether to employ a contractual approach to
disposition agreements maps onto the debate about whether such agreements, like
contracts pertaining to family relationships, inherently violate public policy. 99
Typically, courts will not enforce marital contracts that deal with matters or relations
“essential to the marital relationship,” specifically, agreements to bear children, on
grounds of public policy.100 Pre-embryo disposition courts and commentators that

93. See Decree of Dissolution of Marriage at 14, Torres v. Terrell, FN 2016-001785
(Super. Ct. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Dissolution Decree] (“This Court believes that
where the parties entered into a written contract regarding the issue, the Court should
commence its analysis by applying the contract if possible to assist in determining the
disposition of the embryos.”).
94. See infra Section II.A.1.
95. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 690 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019).
96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(B) (Supp. 2018).
97. See supra text accompanying note 86.
98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(A)(3) (Supp. 2018).
99. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 42, at 415 (“Professor John Robertson contends that
gamete donors who voluntarily and advisedly enter into a contract prior to IVF regarding the
disposition of unused embryos should be able to rely upon the enforcement of the agreement.
Professor Carl H. Coleman maintains that contracts concerning family relationships violate
public policy and are unenforceable upon a change of mind by either party.”).
100. THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON CONTRACTS 25 (7th ed. 2016).
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favor enforcement advocate a contracts approach and do not see a violation of public
policy, whereas those that oppose enforcement are likely to see a violation and favor
a contemporaneous agreement approach.101
2. The Contemporaneous Agreement Approach
Only a small minority of states have employed the contemporaneous agreement
approach to pre-embryo disputes.102 Like the contract approach, the
contemporaneous agreement approach maintains that decisions about pre-embryo
disposition belong equally to the gamete providers.103 However, the
contemporaneous agreement approach differs from the contract approach in that it
allows the parties to invalidate the prior agreement if one party unilaterally has a
change of heart—at any point.104
As a result, this approach requires that courts not mandate any further action until
the parties reach mutual consent.105 In In re Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court
explained that, because procreative decisions are “intensely emotional,” people may
“act more on the basis of feeling and instinct than rational deliberation.”106 As a
result, the court reasoned, it might not be possible to make an informed decision
“relinquish[ing] a right in advance of the time the right is to be exercised.”107 The In
re Witten court, analogizing to the validity of contemporaneous divorce
stipulations,108 opines that doing so avoids problematic policy concerns that would
otherwise be implicated, because parties who can change their minds are not being
contractually forced into a familial relationship but rather make a mutual decision to
be implemented immediately.109
Critics lament that this approach undermines the integrity of agreements between
gamete providers. Haslett says that even the J.B. v. M.B. court’s contracts limitation
that allows parties to make subsequent modifications up until the point of litigation
“eliminat[es] the vital security which contracts provide.”110 As a result, alarm at the

101. Compare Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180–81 (N.Y. 1998) (favoring a contracts
approach), with In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777–78 (Iowa 2003) (favoring a
contemporaneous agreement approach).
102. See Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition upon Divorce, 29 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233 n.3 (2013).
103. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and
Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84
MINN. L. REV. 55, 81 (1999)).
104. See id. at 778 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 110).
105. See id.
106. Id. at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 98). For a discussion of the
problematic view of infertility patients as emotional and desperate, see M ADEIRA, supra note
89, at 71–73.
107. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Coleman, supra note 103, at 98).
108. Id. at 781–82.
109. Id. at 779–83. This is similar reasoning but a different conclusion to that used by the
A.Z. v. B.Z. court, which avoids public policy violations by allowing parties to subsequently
modify their disposition agreements up until the point of the disposition proceedings. See A.Z.
v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–59 (Mass. 2000).
110. Haslett, supra note 82, at 196–97.
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contemporaneous agreement approach, which not only extends the unilateral right to
withdraw from a predisposition agreement to any point but also prohibits the court
from acting without mutual agreement, is necessarily greater.
3. The Balancing Test Approach
Other courts have opted to balance the gamete providers’ interests. Similar to the
contemporaneous agreement approach, courts applying a balancing test recognize
that disposition agreements are enforceable until either party changes their mind
about disposition prior to the pre-embryos’ award to one party.111 In contrast to the
contemporaneous agreement approach, however, courts will not wait for parties to
reach a mutual agreement, but will balance the parties’ interests to decide the best
result.112 Other courts, like the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Rooks,
only use the balancing approach if there is no contract, or if the contract does not
address disposition.113 In balancing the parties’ interests, courts typically give greater
weight to the party who wishes to avoid procreation.114
For instance, in J.B. v. M.B., where a divorcing husband wanted to use the preembryos and the wife did not, the New Jersey Supreme Court avoided the state’s
limitations on contracts pertaining to family relationships for public policy reasons
by recognizing that both parties had a right to change their minds. 115 The court found
that the consent form was not a memorialization of the divorcing couple’s intentions,
allowing the court to determine the pre-embryos’ disposition.116
The husband and wife also asserted constitutional rights to procreate and not
procreate, respectively.117 The husband argued that his right to procreate outweighed
his wife’s right not to procreate because her bodily integrity was not implicated by
the pre-embryos’ transfer to someone else’s uterus.118 The husband also argued that
his religious convictions as well as the state’s interest in protecting life outweighed
the wife’s interest.119 Ultimately, the New Jersey court agreed with the Tennessee
court in Davis that the party avoiding procreation should usually prevail if the other
party can procreate without the pre-embryos.120 While a few lower courts have sided
with the partner who wishes to procreate, this is not the prevailing view, and has not
been used by any state supreme courts.121
Turning to Arizona, despite the Torres court’s reliance on J.B. v. M.B. in
attempting to balance interests, the test in J.B. v. M.B. is different because it weighs
only the gamete providers’ interests, and does not include the state’s or pre-embryo’s

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 201–02.
See id.
429 P.3d 579, 581, 586 (Colo. 2018).
Haslett, supra note 82, at 202.
783 A.2d 707, 710, 718–19 (N.J. 2001).
Id. at 714.
See id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 716.
Madeira, supra note 5, at 20–24.
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interests in making its determination.122 It is not clear from the Torres order why, in
contrast to past applications of the balancing test, the Arizona court considered the
state’s and pre-embryo’s interests as equal, or perhaps greater, than the interests of
Torres and Terrell. The balancing test used by the Arizona Court of Appeals,
however, by discarding the influence of Arizona’s “strong family values” statute,
used a balancing test that was closer to that employed by other courts undertaking to
balance the parties’ interests. On the other hand, while the trial court’s holding was
consistent with the prevailing view that the interests of the party wishing to avoid
procreation would normally outweigh the interests of the party wishing to procreate,
the court of appeals’ holding, by granting the pre-embryos to Torres, clearly favored
the interests of the party wishing to procreate.
II. ARIZONA’S TORRES V. TERRELL AND SECTION 318.03
The struggle of legal systems to address the challenges that surplus cryopreserved
pre-embryos pose dates back to the case of an American couple that died in a plane
crash in 1984, leaving two frozen pre-embryos in Melbourne, Australia, and no
disposition agreement to guide disposal.123 Decades later, the interests and issues
identified in this incident remain so deeply personal, philosophical, and unresolved
that it was perhaps inevitable that cryopreserved pre-embryos would be subject to
case law and statutes, like those in Arizona, that bear the marks of a pluralistic society
trying to resolve fundamentally conflicting views. This does not mean, however, that
the Arizona standards are workable or wise.
A. Torres v. Terrell
As discussed below, the trial court’s ruling in Torres v. Terrell was highly
problematic. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was challenged, and the Arizona Court of
Appeals issued an order in March 2019 to vacate the trial court’s ruling. 124 The
analyses of both courts are discussed in turn.
1. Trial Court
In the 2017 Torres case, the trial judge mandated involuntary donation of the preembryos in question to a third party, instead of to the gamete providers, 125 Ruby
Torres and John Terrell, a couple with an on-again, off-again relationship of ten
years.126 In 2014, shortly after Torres was diagnosed with breast cancer, the couple
decided to undergo IVF in order to cryopreserve their pre-embryos so that Torres
could preserve her ability to have genetically related children posttreatment. 127 As
part of the routine paperwork outlining their relationship with the fertility clinic, the

122. See infra text accompanying note 148.
123. See STATE OF VICTORIA, supra note 14, at 5.
124. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 694 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019), review granted in
part, CV-19-0106-PR, 2019 Ariz. LEXIS 226 (Ariz. Aug. 27, 2019).
125. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 21.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 7–8.
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couple signed a predisposition agreement form.128 A few days later, the couple
married.129
After undergoing IVF, but before transferring any of their pre-embryos, Torres
and Terrell then decided to divorce and disagreed about what to do with the preembryos.130 Terrell wanted the embryos to be discarded or remain frozen unless the
parties came to an agreement.131 Torres wanted to gestate the pre-embryos herself
because she was unlikely to be able to have biological children without them
following her cancer treatment.132
The state trial court, noting that there was no law on point, used both contract
principles and Arizona policy concerns to analyze and decide the case.133
Referencing cases in other states like Davis v. Davis,134 Kass v. Kass,135 and A.Z. v.
B.Z.,136 where courts began by interpreting the pre-embryo disposition contract,137
the Arizona court found that the “Embryo Cryopreservation & Embryo Disposition”
agreement between the fertility clinic, Torres, and Terrell was ambiguous and could
not be used to resolve the issue.138 Nonetheless, the court isolated a few sections that
informed its decision.139 The most relevant section reads as follows:
H. Divorce or Dissolution of Relationship
In the event the patient and her spouse are divorced or the patient and her
partner dissolve their relationship, we agree that the embryos should be
disposed of in the following manner (check one box only):
A court decree and/or settlement agreement will be presented to the
Clinic directing use to achieve a pregnancy in one of us or donation to
another couple for that purpose.140
The box next to the court decree option was checked and initialed by both Torres and
Terrell.141
Another clause on page thirteen of the agreement, however, appeared to conflict
with this choice. That clause states that after divorce, the pre-embryos cannot be used
by either party “without the express, written consent of both parties.”142 The parties

128. Id. at 7.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 8–9.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 11–16.
134. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
135. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
136. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
137. See supra Part I(b)(1).
138. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 13–16.
139. Id. at 11–12.
140. Notice of Filing of Copy of Contract with Bloom Reproductive Institute at 16, Terrell
v. Torres, No. FN 2016-001785 (filed May 12, 2017) [hereinafter Disposition Agreement].
141. Id.
142. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 16.
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made no individualized notation to this part of the agreement although both Torres
and Terrell initialed at the bottom of the page, which contained a number of
provisions and four separately numbered sections.143 Despite finding that the contract
contained contradictory clauses, the court concluded that the parties did not intend
for any surplus pre-embryos to be destroyed.144
The court then referenced Davis and New Jersey Supreme Court case J.B. v.
M.B.,145 and attempted to apply a balancing test.146 This balancing test, as employed
by other courts, has balanced the interests of the two gamete providers.147 The
Arizona court, however, included the pre-embryos’ interests under the “best interests
of the child” standard, even after acknowledging that a pre-embryo is not a child.148
The Torres court also purportedly based its ruling on statutory language, current
scientific knowledge about pre-embryo development, the unresolved debate about
when life begins, and judicial restraint.149
Despite finding that a pre-embryo is not a child, the Torres court muddied the
waters by considering three Arizona policies concerning children and families: (1)
“promot[ing] strong families”; (2) “promot[ing] strong family values”; and (3)
establishing that a child’s best interest, in the absence of contrary evidence, is served
by “hav[ing] substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing parenting time with
both parents” and “hav[ing] both parents participate in decision making about the
child.”150 The court said that giving the pre-embryos to Torres would violate these
policies because the parents were unlikely to effectively co-parent, and Terrell did
not want to procreate with Torres.151 Later, the court asserted that, while it would not
get involved in co-parenting disputes before a child exists, it would nonetheless be
contrary to public policy to rule in such a way that Torres and Terrell would litigate
future parenting disputes.152
2. Court of Appeals
In October 2017, Torres appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and oral
arguments took place in June 2018.153 On appeal, Torres argued that the disposition
agreement was not ambiguous, and that even if it was, the court incorrectly applied

143. Disposition Agreement, supra note 140, at 13.
144. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 14.
145. Id. at 18.
146. Id. at 18–20.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 164–69.
148. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 19–20. In doing so, the court discussed with
approval, although it did not adopt, the court’s holding in Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121
P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005), that pre-embryos were not persons under Arizona’s wrongful
death statute because they were outside the womb. Id.
149. See Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 12–13.
150. Id. at 18.
151. Id. at 19.
152. Id. at 20.
153. Appeal Docket, Terrell v. Torres, 1 CA-CV 17-0617 FC (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017)
(on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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the balancing test.154 Torres first asserted that the court erred in finding ambiguity in
the agreement because section H was part of the “dickered deal,” as demonstrated by
the fact that Torres and Terrell selected their chosen option.155 In contrast, the
language in paragraph 10 of the agreement was simply boilerplate language included
on behalf of the fertility clinic.156 Thus, Torres argued, the “dickered” section H
should override the boilerplate language in paragraph 10.157 Torres then claimed that
the trial court misapplied the balancing test since,158 by awarding the pre-embryos to
a third party, the court incorrectly included third-party interests when only the
spouses’ interests should be considered.159 On appeal, Terrell changed his stance
from requesting disposal to third-party donation.160 In reply, Torres contended that
the court erroneously balanced the spouses’ interests in giving Terrell’s desire not to
procreate more weight than Torres’s desire to procreate.161
Not surprisingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision hinged on how it treated
the disposition agreement.162 It might have been supposed, however, that if the court
found the agreement to be unambiguous, it would uphold the lower court’s ruling
because the trial court opted for one of the options specified in the agreement. While
the dissent takes this view, the majority did not.163 On the other hand, it might be
supposed that if the court found the agreement ambiguous, it would grapple with
applying a balancing test. Yet, while the majority concluded that under Arizona law,
it must give weight to specific contract provisions over general provisions, 164 a point
of law with which the dissent agreed,165 they split on application,166 with the majority
concluding that “[s]ubsection H unambiguously governs disposition of the embryos
by providing the written consent to overcome the more general ‘Note.’ In making the
choice to allow the court to determine the disposition, the court was required to
employ the balancing approach.”167
Applying a balancing test anew, the appeals court held that the pre-embryos
should be awarded to Torres,168 one of the two choices specified in section H.169 After
reviewing the three dominant approaches to pre-embryo disputes, the court of
appeals adopted the contracts approach with the balancing test resolving situations

154. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Terrell, 1 CA-CV 17-0617 FC.
155. Id. at 21–23.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 23.
159. Id. at 24–25.
160. Appellee’s Response Brief at 1, Terrell, 1 CA-CV 17-0617 FC.
161. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 7, Terrell, 1 CA-CV 17-0617 FC.
162. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 690–91 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019) , review granted in
part, CV-19-0106-PR, 2019 Ariz. LEXIS 226 (Ariz. Aug. 27, 2019).
163. See id. at 690–91 (majority opinion), 695 (Cruz, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 690.
165. Id. at 695–96 (Cruz, J., dissenting).
166. Compare id. at 690–91 (majority opinion), with 695–96 (Cruz, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 690 (internal citation omitted).
168. Id. at 694.
169. See id. at 685.
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where there is “no prior agreement, or if the agreement leaves the decision to the
court.”170
The court of appeals’ application of the balancing test was significantly different
from the trial court’s application. First, the court of appeals explicitly rejected any
use of Arizona’s family values policies. In a footnote, the court of appeals disagreed
with the trial court’s conclusion that litigation over any future children was
unavoidable and found that the statute containing the policy objective of
“promot[ing] strong families [and] . . . strong family values” was “inapplicable.” 171
The dissent agreed with the majority on this point.172
Second, the court of appeals determined that the trial court erred, as a matter of
law, in considering the right of procreational autonomy in the context of the
balancing test.173 Even though the trial court was unclear as to whether there was a
right not to procreate, it nonetheless concluded that Terrell’s “right not to be
compelled to be a parent outweigh[ed] [Torres’s] right to procreate.”174 The court of
appeals said that this framework was not useful in pre-embryo disposition disputes
because “constitutional rights are directed at protecting an individual against
government intrusion on personal decisions regarding reproduction.”175 The court
justified this statement by saying that Torres and Terrell “empowered the court” to
decide their pre-embryo dispute, and thus, the trial court should not have considered
these constitutional rights.176
At the same, the court of appeals seemingly adopted the prevailing view that the
interests of the parent wishing not to procreate would normally outweigh the interests
of the parent wishing to procreate. The court said, “we agree with other jurisdictions
that the party who does not wish to become a parent should prevail if the other party
has a ‘reasonable possibility’ of becoming a parent without the use of the
embryos.”177 The dissent criticized the majority on this point, stating that while this
case does not present the typical government intrusion on personal reproductive
decisions, the majority “err[ed] by separating the parties’ rights from the interests
protected by those rights.”178
Third, the courts differed in how they weighted Torres’s interest in having
children. The court of appeals pointed out the apparent inconsistency in the trial court
finding that Torres had less than a one percent chance of having biological children,
but nonetheless concluding that the “mere possibility” of having biological children
tipped the balance against Torres.179 The court of appeals then discussed how
unlikely it was that Torres would be able to have biological children even through
adoption, both because there was expert testimony that there were a limited number
of embryos available for adoption and because Torres’s medical history made it

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 689.
Id. at 693 n.11 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 698 n.12 (Cruz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 693.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting trial court).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 698 (Cruz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 692.
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unlikely.180 Largely because of this fact, despite adopting the general view “that the
party who does not wish to become a parent should prevail if the other party has a
‘reasonable possibility’ of becoming a parent without the use of the embryos,” the
court of appeals held that Torres’s interest in the pre-embryos outweighed Terrell’s
interest.181
B. Section 318.03
Section 318.03, passed in March 2018,182 provides that pre-embryos will be
awarded in divorce dissolutions to the spouse “who intends to allow the in vitro
human embryos to develop to birth.”183 When both spouses have this intention but
only one donated gametes, the pre-embryos will be awarded to the gamete
provider.184 The law also contains a contract override provision so that “[i]f an
agreement between the spouses concerning the disposition of the in vitro human
embryos is brought before the court in [divorce proceedings], the court shall award
the in vitro human embryos” to the spouse intending to bring the pre-embryos to
birth; thus, Arizona has adopted a most likely to lead to birth standard for pre-embryo
disposition disputes, notwithstanding contractual agreements to the contrary. 185
Moreover, section 318.03 takes the additional step of defining parental rights and
responsibilities—something that judicial opinions in pre-embryo divorce disputes
have not done. The law specifies that whichever spouse is not awarded the preembryos loses all parental rights and obligations unless the spouse is a gamete
provider and consents in writing to parenthood.186 This legislative mandate is an
update to the Torres order, which stated that Torres could not waive a child support
claim of Terrell and noted that there was no mechanism in Arizona, such as the
Uniform Parentage Act, to relieve a spouse of parental responsibilities.187 The
Arizona legislature goes on to say that without this consent, any resulting children
are deprived of all rights and obligations.188 Finally, gamete providers who do not
consent to parenthood are required to provide detailed health and family history
information to the spouse who is awarded the pre-embryos.189
While section 318.03 has yet to be considered by any court, had it been in effect
when the trial court was deciding Torres, the court almost certainly would have
settled the case by awarding the pre-embryos to Torres because, under section
318.03(A), she is the spouse wanting to give them life. The issue of contractual

180. Id.
181. Id. at 690 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992)).
182. Bill
History
for
SB1393,
AZLEG.GOV,
https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/BillOverview/70559 [https://perma.cc/2PQY-46WR].
183. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(A)(1) (2018).
184. Id. § 318.03(A)(3).
185. Id. § 318.03(B).
186. Id. § 318.03(C).
187. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 9, 12, 20. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 705 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
188. tit. 25, § 318.03(D).
189. Id. § 318.03(E). While the mandated provision of medical information and
examinations is outside the scope of this Note, it raises other significant privacy concerns.

2020]

WI LD WES T OF PR E- E MBR YO DI S P OSI TIO N

317

ambiguity would be irrelevant because section 318.03(B) provides for a contractual
override. The court of appeals mentions the statute and explains its effect, but notes
that because the statute was not in effect when the trial court issued its order, the
court of appeals is “not bound by it in reaching a resolution.” 190
Following section 318.03’s passage, the open questions now are (1) whether a
state legislature and court can override procreative liberty by mandating a categorical
“most likely to lead to birth” standard for pre-embryos disposition disputes and (2)
whether a court or legislature can now go one step further and mandate donation of
pre-embryos when both spouses wish to destroy them. The first may have been made
inadvertently easier for Arizona by the Torres court of appeals because the court
made the point of separating the question of procreative liberty rights from the preembryo disposition analysis.191 The court of appeals also failed to make any mention
of the propriety of forced third-party donation in the trial court’s order. This, coupled
with the removal of assessing procreative rights in the analysis, may have opened the
door much wider to mandatory donation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Probably the most pressing question that the Torres holdings and section 318.03
present is whether they can be successfully challenged as violations of the
constitutionally protected right to procreative liberty. From the Arizona courts’
perspectives, this right already bears upon this issue; the Torres court considered
claims of constitutionally protected procreative rights,192 and the Jeter court
recognized that any law concerning pre-embryos’ legal status is subject to
constitutional restraints.193 While the Torres court of appeals declined to use such a
“framework” when two individuals are in a disposition dispute and a prior agreement
does not resolve the dispute, its reasoning would seem to be either that the individuals
contracted away their claims to these rights or that the court, by being granted the
power under a contract to decide a disposition dispute, is somehow no longer a
government actor.194 While a discussion of whether individuals can contract their
rights away in this manner is outside the scope of this Note, the reasoning of the court
of appeals appears flawed. While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does
sometimes permit individuals to give up constitutional rights, the context of preembryo disposition disputes does not involve a regulatory actor, nor is the benefit in
question, access to the courts to vindicate fundamental rights, a privilege. 195 The
effect of this reasoning would be to deprive a small class of people, those with
predisposition agreements indicating disputes would be settled in court, of

190. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 689, n.7 (Ariz. App. Div. 2019), review granted in
part, CV-19-0106-PR, 2019 Ariz. LEXIS 226 (Ariz. Aug. 27, 2019).
191. See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
192. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 19–20.
193. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
194. Torres, 438 P.3d at 693.
195. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV.
593 (1990).
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vindicating their procreative rights vis-à-vis their pre-embryos in this court, an effect
that is seemingly ripe for an equal protection challenge.
Because of these issues, this Note takes the view that, consistent with prior
Arizona court rulings, procreative rights are relevant to pre-embryo disposition
disputes. As a result, Section A argues that constitutional challenges should be
brought on both substantive due process and equal protection grounds while Section
B asserts that procreative liberty protections should include procreation via IVF.
A. Procreative Liberty is a Fundamental Right Protected by Substantive Due
Process and Equal Protection
The Supreme Court has articulated fundamental rights protected under
substantive due process doctrine in different ways, but there are a few prevalent
themes that run throughout this doctrine. First, “fundamental rights” are not just
limited to those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.196 Rather, liberties that are
“rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people”197 or “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty” can be fundamental.198 It was articulated by Justice Harlan as “a
rational continuum which . . . includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints and which also recognizes . . . that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment.”199
With this general understanding of fundamental rights, it is very likely that preembryo disposition decisions would be protected from state infringement like the
Torres court’s mandatory donation ruling and section 318.03’s contractual override
provision. In discussing the similar effect of a New Mexico statute requiring
implantation of all pre-embryos, scholars have concluded that such regulations
implicate fundamental substantive due process rights because they bear upon an
individual’s reproductive and decision-making rights by entailing a judgment about
the legal status of the pre-embryo, which determines the weight of the state’s
interest.200 Commentators have also called the Louisiana statute granting preembryos personhood “constitutionally questionable.”201
On the other hand, while the reasoning of the court of appeals vis-à-vis the
relevance of procreative rights is questionable, the holding is less vulnerable to attack
than either the trial court’s holding or section 318.03, because the court, in balancing
the parties’ interests, weighted the likelihood of Torres ever becoming a parent by
any means. It was this fact that the court of appeals relied on in deciding not to follow
the general rule of preferencing the interests of the party wishing to avoid procreation

196. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933).
197. Id.
198. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
199. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
200. Cynthia Reilly, Constitutional Limits on New Mexico’s In Vitro Fertilization Law, 24
N.M. L. REV. 125, 129–30 (1994).
201. Weber, supra note 17, at 554 (citing Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine Is Mine, but What’s
Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of State Statutes that Mandate the Implantation of
Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 593–94 (2002)).
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over the wishes of the party wishing to procreate in a case where two individuals’
procreative rights are diametrically opposed to each other—not to the state. Because
the court’s reasoning is based on the parties’ interests (albeit not explicitly on their
rights) and not the state’s interests, it will be harder for either party to show an
unconstitutional infringement.202 The appeals court’s view that parties to a preembryo dispute that have agreed to let the court adjudicate the dispute creates a class
of people who are unable to bring their fundamental procreative rights to bear in the
court’s decision, which raises equal protection concerns. But, because this challenge
is less likely than those arising from forced pre-embryo adoption or implantation, the
below analysis focuses primarily on the trial court’s ruling and section 318.03.
If a reviewing court determines that pre-embryo disposition decision-making is a
fundamental right, then laws regulating these decisions will likely have to pass strict
scrutiny, which is almost always “fatal in fact.”203 In this case, it is likely that the
Torres court’s ruling and section 318.03 would be invalidated under this framework.
Strict scrutiny requires a compelling state interest and a narrowly-drawn statute,204
and it is unlikely that Arizona’s interests in mandatory adoption or implantation
would outweigh an individual’s interest in procreative liberty.
1. State Interests
Based on the court’s reasoning in Lifchez v. Hartigan, “[s]ince there is no
compelling state interest sufficient to prevent a woman from terminating her
pregnancy during the first trimester . . . there can be no such interest sufficient to
intrude upon these other protected activities [for example, IVF].”205 While Lifchez

202. It is possible that the Ninth Circuit or U.S. Supreme Court would adopt a per se rule
requiring that the party wishing to exercise their right not to procreate should always win in a
dispute, but given the unsettled area of the law, the personal nature of the right, and a host of
prudential concerns, it seems unlikely that a reviewing federal court would put itself in this
kind of corner.
203. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). The exact test to be applied
in substantive due process jurisprudence is uncertain because in decisions like Planned
Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas the Court did not apply strict scrutiny. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opinion). However, regardless of the label of the
test employed by the Court, it will almost certainly require heightened scrutiny, as it did in
both Casey and Lawrence, see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582–83 (O’Connor., J., concurring);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (plurality opinion), which will be difficult for the Arizona court order
and statute to pass. Also, as noted below, if the Court situates pre-embryo disposition decisionmaking within abortion jurisprudence, then the test will not be strict scrutiny, but undue
burden. See infra text accompanying note 257. The precise substantive due process test may
not matter, however, because if the Court identifies pre-embryo disposition decision-making
as a fundamental right, then challengers can bring an equal protection claim which will require
strict
scrutiny.
See
Equal
Protection,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equal_protection [https://perma.cc/VA6A-J87S].
204. Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny
[https://perma.cc/8KBC-7AL5].
205. 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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was decided before Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
when the Supreme Court discarded Roe v. Wade’s trimester test,206 this reasoning is
still valid because abortion—in which there is a protected interest—always
necessarily occurs later in fetal development than the pre-embryo stage. 207
Because none of the states’ interests in foundational reproductive rights cases like
Skinner v. Oklahoma,208 Griswold v. Connecticut,209 Eisenstadt v. Baird,210 Carey v.
Population Services, International,211 Roe,212 and Casey213 were enough to pass
heightened review, it is unlikely that Arizona’s interest in mandatory pre-embryo
donation or implantation will be considered compelling, which would keep the trial
court ruling and statute from passing strict scrutiny. The only realistic articulation of
Arizona’s interest is in protecting human life from the point of conception.214 In
section 318.03, the state’s interest dictates the statutory outcome: pre-embryos are
awarded to whichever spouse is likeliest to ensure their birth. 215 The Torres court’s
insistence that it was acting in furtherance of strong families and strong family values
strongly implies that it considered a pre-embryo a family member. This is especially
true since the court did not consider highly relevant factual matters such as the very
low statistical likelihood that pre-embryos will actually become viable family
members because pre-embryos are most likely to stop developing before the fetal
stage.216 In addition, the court did not consider how many potential adoptive parents
would be interested in and able to afford the invasive and expensive process of preembryo adoption and implantation.
Arizona’s interest runs afoul of cases like Roe and Casey, which have already put
clear parameters around how a state can permissibly infringe on procreative liberty
in the name of protecting human life, and to what degree the state’s interest begins
to trump the mother’s interest once the fetus is viable.217 Because pre-embryos are

206. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 17–21.
208. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that forced sterilization under Oklahoma’s Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
209. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives was an unconstitutional violation of privacy).
210. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
211. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding, inter alia, that the state’s interest in regulating morality
to minors was insufficient to defeat a challenge to a state contraception law under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
212. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a Texas statute prohibiting abortion
was an impermissible violation of personal liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment).
213. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that the husband
notification provision of a Pennsylvania abortion statute was a constitutional violation).
214. Brown, supra note 31, at 234 (discussing Louisiana’s assignment of juridical rights to
pre-embryos: “The only possible compelling state interest in prohibiting preembryo discard
and enacting legislation requiring mandatory donation is the protection of potential human
life.”).
215. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (Supp. 2018).
216. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
217. See infra text accompanying note 248.

2020]

WI LD WES T OF PR E- E MBR YO DI S P OSI TIO N

321

not fetuses, viability is impossible, and the state’s interest in protecting life cannot
override parents’ liberty interests.
One possible state justification that will not gain traction is the religious or moral
belief in the sanctity of human life at any stage, which has never been strong enough
to dictate outcomes in abortion cases. Much of the objection to abortion cases and
the driving force behind “pro-life” measures have come from religiously-motivated
actors.218 For instance, Louisiana’s heavily Catholic population helps to explain its
embryonic personhood approach.219 And, in Arizona, the Thomas More Society—a
national organization professing to “restor[e] respect in law for life, family, and
religious liberty”220—helped to pass section 318.03.221 But, in Carey, the Court,
while recognizing that teenage pregnancy could have devastating effects, would not
accept that New York’s interest in protecting the morality of its citizens was
compelling enough to override the procreative liberty of its citizens vis-à-vis
contraception, several forms of which would prevent pre-embryos from
implanting.222
Morality will prove equally unavailing for Arizona. Justice O’Connor wrote in
Casey that “[s]ome of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”223 Furthermore, decisions like
Bowers v. Hardwick that were premised on purely moral justifications have since
been overturned.224 Since the life-begins-at-conception campaign is largely, perhaps
exclusively, concerned with religious and moral tenets and outcomes, 225 a court
adjudicating a pre-embryo disposition dispute should avoid prioritizing these
interests over those of the gamete providers. While the Supreme Court has
recognized that the government can use police powers to protect morality in other

218. See, e.g., Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Who Deserves Custody of an Embryo?: Reason
Roundup, REASON (July 20, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://reason.com/blog/2018/07/20/embryo
-custody-battles-heating-up [https://perma.cc/4ARH-E64U] (stating that the Thomas More
Society, an anti-abortion group, helped get Arizona’s new law passed).
219. Howell, supra note 42, at 412.
220. Home Page, THOMAS MORE SOC’Y, https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/
[https://perma.cc/CT9B-QXL4].
221. Brown, supra note 218.
222. Brown, supra note 31, at 206, and accompanying text.
223. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (plurality opinion).
224. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
225. For instance, the Thomas More Society, which was involved in the Arizona
legislation, is named after Sir Thomas More who is the patron saint of attorneys in the Catholic
faith.
Sir
Thomas
More,
THOMAS
MORE
SOC’Y,
https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/about/sir-thomas-more/
[https://perma.cc/HE9RKKK7]. The tag line of the Thomas More Society is to “restor[e] respect in law for life, family,
and religious liberty.” Home, THOMAS MORE SOC’Y, https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/
[https://perma.cc/VLF3-23Z9]. But see Maureen Condic, A Scientific View of When Life
Begins, CHARLOTTE LOZIER INST.: ON POINT 1, 5 (June 2014), https://s27589.pcdn.co/wp
-content/uploads/2014/06/On-Point-Scientific-View-of-When-Life-Begins-Condic-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LE4-4QJC] (arguing that the premise that life begins at conception is
merely understanding how cells and organisms function but tells us nothing of how that fact
should be used).
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doctrinal areas,226 the privacy cases make clear that this rationale cannot apply to
deeply personal decisions made in protected contexts.
Moreover, while much of the state’s interest in Torres was articulated as a desire
for strong families and strong family values,227 this interest is unlikely to be viewed
as compelling, nor the resultant restrictions appropriately tailored, when weighed
against the individual gamete providers’ interests in procreative liberty. First, the
phrases “strong families” and “strong family values” are likely coded language for
the protection of life, addressed above.228 Second, the State in Griswold articulated
analogous justifications when it attempted to justify contraception laws because they
served its policy interest of discouraging adultery in order to protect the family
unit.229 The Court found that the statute in question would not further the state’s
interest, which caused it to fail the tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. 230
Similarly, Arizona’s family policy justifications for forced pre-embryo donation and
section 318.03 must fail. Given how unlikely it is for pre-embryos to end in live birth
and the lack of evidence on the demand for pre-embryo adoption in Arizona, 231 a
court is very likely to determine that forced donation or a most-likely-to-lead-to-birth
standard is not necessary for Arizona to promote strong families. 232
2. Individual Interests
In terms of the individual spouses’ interests, the right to privacy is the
fundamental right most strongly implicated in pre-embryo disputes. Given the
Court’s privacy jurisprudence on abortion, contraception, and parental decisionmaking, it is very likely that the question at the heart of pre-embryo disposition
disputes, whether to “bear or beget” via ART, can be situated within one of these
existing doctrines. While the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, it has been understood to protect “personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.”233 The doctrine began as an understanding of “penumbras” that
“emanat[ed]” from enumerated protections in the Bill of Rights. 234 While the Court
has moved away from this “zones of privacy” view,235 personal decision-making in

226. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
227. See supra text accompanying note 149.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 184–86.
229. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497–98 (1965); Brown, supra note 31, at 204.
230. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497–98.
231. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
232. It is also unclear what family model the state wishes to support, but this is likely to
prove problematic as well. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court rejected an
application of a zoning law to exclude nonnuclear families by saying “the Constitution
prevents [the government] from standardizing its children—and its adults—by forcing all to
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.” 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
233. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted).
234. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (1965).
235. See Dawn Johnsen, State Court Protection of Reproductive Rights: The Past, the
Perils, and the Promise, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41, 52 (2015) (“The U.S. Supreme Court
primarily relies upon the constitutional protections of ‘liberty’ in the Fifth and Fourteenth
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certain contexts has continued to be protected as a fundamental right, and this
protection has been extended over time to include marital decisions, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child-rearing236—all issues potentially
implicated in a challenge to the Torres ruling or section 318.03.
The right to procreate was established by the Supreme Court in Skinner v.
Oklahoma. At the time, Oklahoma mandated that certain convicts be forcefully
sterilized.237 The Court invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds,
recognizing that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.”238 Procreative liberty was then extended to protect the use
of contraception for married couples.239 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the
right to use contraception was extended via the Equal Protection Clause to single
people.240 According to the Court, states cannot justify differential treatment by class,
such as married versus unmarried contraception users, unless the legislation is
“reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” 241 Furthermore, the Court
stated, “[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.”242
The decision on whether to gestate or donate pre-embryos is obviously a “decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”243 In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court
acknowledged this relationship when it discussed the appellate court’s holding that
allowing Mrs. Davis to implant the pre-embryos over Mr. Davis’s objection was a
violation of his “constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no
pregnancy has taken place . . . .”244
In addition, several forms of contraception work by preventing pre-embryonic
development and implantation, which causes the cells to be passed during the
woman’s menstrual cycle.245 Given this, Howell argues that “it is illogical to say she
must treat the same embryos as protected human life when they are frozen in nitrous
oxide.”246 In fact, it seems likely that it would violate the equal protection clause for
a state to require otherwise, as in Eisenstadt. An equal protection challenge should
be brought because the Torres ruling and section 318.03 both mandate that divorcing
couples with pre-embryos be treated differently than married couples with pre-

Amendments, sometimes (though with decreasing frequency) describing the right as one of
privacy.”).
236. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
237. Brown, supra note 31, at 202.
238. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
239. Brown, supra note 31, at 203.
240. 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
241. Id. (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
242. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
243. Id.
244. 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992).
245. Howell, supra note 42, at 413.
246. Id.
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embryos, and couples who have undergone IVF be treated differently than couples
achieving pregnancy coitally.
3. Application of Abortion Jurisprudence
Furthermore, post-Skinner, procreative liberty has been extended to the ability to
end a pregnancy through abortion. While this protection is subject to restrictions and
has been continually controversial since Roe,247 the core protection remains relatively
unchanged.248 Further, even though viability can be used to limit procreative liberty
in the abortion context,249 such concerns are inapposite to cryopreserved pre-embryos
because they are undisputedly nonviable. While both the Roe and Casey courts
recognized that a woman’s procreative liberty could be outweighed eventually by the
state’s interest in protecting a viable fetus,250 the Court concluded that the exact point
of fetal viability is still unknown.251 In contrast, it is known that pre-embryos are not
viable.
While abortion doctrine is a useful analogy, abortion and pre-embryo disposition
are not the same thing. In abortion, pregnancy has already occurred, but this is not
the case with pre-embryos. As a result, any potential “life-in-being” is at a very
different stage of development in each procedure, and the woman’s physical integrity
is implicated in different ways. Moreover, absent any affirmative termination
measures, a pregnancy will usually result in a live birth. 252 In contrast, pre-embryos,
absent medical intervention, will stop developing; it would take the affirmative step
of successful implantation to result in live birth.253 While this distinction between
abortion and pre-embryo disposition may be relevant in determining which
constitutional test to analyze Arizona pre-embryo disposition law under,254 it has also
already been used by courts like Davis to illustrate the shared decision-making
interests of both gamete providers255—but not that states like Arizona are free to
usurp the reproductive decision-making role.
Scholars in favor of greater personal liberty protections in pre-embryo dispute
dispositions are likely to argue that privacy in the context of abortion jurisprudence
supports a similar right to privacy in the context of forced pre-embryo donations or
transfers of cryopreserved pre-embryos, but should not be imported as a standard.256
Carrying abortion decisions over wholesale would mean that any challenges would

247. Johnsen, supra note 235, at 41.
248. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992).
249. See id.
250. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
251. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
252. Mandy Oaklander, Women Now Have as Many Miscarriages as Abortions, TIME
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://time.com/4144897/birth-rate-abortion-miscarriage/ [https://perma.cc/
98M2-JDQN] (“[O]f the pregnancies in 2010, 65% resulted in live births, 17% were
miscarried and 18% ended in abortion.”).
253. Brown, supra note 31, at 236.
254. See infra text accompanying note 257.
255. See Reilly, supra note 200, at 134 n.98.
256. See Brown, supra note 31, at 225.
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be evaluated under an undue burden standard, whereas a strict scrutiny approach
would be more appropriate.257
Others may argue that a right to procreative autonomy—or privacy in general—
is not even implicated in pre-embryo disposition because there is no pregnancy, and
thus physical integrity is not a concern.258 But this view does not address the fact that
cryopreservation alone implicates physical integrity because without it, women are
likely to have to undergo additional rounds of expensive, invasive, and painful
IVF.259 Furthermore, the outcome is then, in a state that mandates transfer or
donation, that a gamete provider could become pregnant and then turn around and
have a legal abortion to avoid an unwanted pregnancy.
Finally, the Supreme Court is not only concerned with privacy rights germane to
physical integrity, but also with privacy protections for personal autonomy
manifested through choice. For instance, in Casey, the Court situated abortion
decisions within two frameworks: one relating to “personal autonomy and bodily
integrity” vis-à-vis the government’s constrained authority to force or deny medical
treatment; and the other, a privacy doctrine which accords decision-making “liberty
relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to
beget or bear a child.”260 If the right to autonomous decision-making only existed in
terms of physical integrity, there would be no need for the Court to include the
application of privacy doctrine, which constitutes the bulk of the opinion.
Privacy cases concerning family relationships, child-rearing, and marriage make
this clear. For instance, in Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court concluded that
states cannot infringe on individual liberty by prohibiting marriage based on racial
distinctions.261 Sex is usually part of the marital relationship, and this could
potentially be used as an argument for why physical integrity is implicated. However,
if this attenuated relationship to physical integrity is enough, then the same should
be true of the remote, but relevant, physical IVF procedures patients undergo.
The same is true of the Court’s approach to family relationships and child-rearing.
In discussing a law making it illegal for German to be taught in public schools, the
Meyer v. Nebraska Court said that liberty under the Due Process Clause, “[w]ithout
doubt[,] . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint.”262 In Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, the Court applied Meyer to invalidate an Oregon law for impermissibly
interfering with parents’ liberty to bring up and educate their children. 263 In assessing
parental rights, the Pierce Court stated that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the [s]tate. . . .”264 This protection was subsequently extended from parents to those
acting as a guardian for a child.265

257. See id. at 224–25.
258. Fotini Antonia Skouvakis, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests Approach
to Decide the Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 885,
905 (2005).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.
260. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (citation omitted).
261. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
262. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
263. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
264. Id. at 535.
265. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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B. Does Procreative Liberty Include IVF?
While the Supreme Court has not considered the question of procreation by ART,
like IVF, in light of privacy rights, it is likely, based on legal scholarship and state
jurisprudence, that this type of deeply personal behavior would be protected under a
right to privacy.266 Even as far back as 1979, when IVF was first emerging, the United
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare concluded that “[s]ince these
rights are reasonably analogous to those recognized by the Court in Skinner,
Griswold, and Eisenstadt, the argument might well be persuasive” in discussing
whether there was a constitutional right to produce via IVF.267 Moreover, scholars
addressing New Mexico’s law in the context of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Skinner
have suggested that it will not withstand a challenge because it requires pre-embryo
transfer and becoming a parent.268
State and federal case law also suggest that IVF and cryopreservation decisionmaking would be included in privacy rights.269 For instance, the Davis v. Davis court
based its decision in part on two Supreme Court premises: the right to procreate
established in Skinner and the right not to procreate established in Carey.270 In
addition, in Lifchez v. Hartigan, a federal district court found a vague Illinois
abortion law that restricted access to certain ART procedures invalid because it
restricted a woman’s “right to make reproductive choices free of governmental
interference with those choices”271—notwithstanding that the reproductive context
was noncoital. The Lifchez court quoted Carey in saying “[t]he decision whether to
beget or bear a child is at the very heart of . . . constitutionally protected choices,” 272
including “the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather
than prevent, pregnancy.”273
An additional question is whether, if pre-embryo disposition decision-making
implicates a privacy right, the right applies to both gamete providers. Case law,
especially state supreme court cases applying a balancing test, suggests that it does,
even though it may not apply equally in all contexts.274 Legal scholars reason that,
unlike in abortion decisions where the procreative rights of pregnant women are
protected over those of their partners,275 in pre-embryo dispositions the woman’s

266. See Reilly, supra note 200, at 129.
267. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 66 (1979) (emphasis omitted),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/559350/HEW_IVF_report.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/B8D7-6CX2].
268. Reilly, supra note 200, at 129–30; Brown, supra note 31, at 186.
269. While outside the scope of this analysis, such a right would likely be a negative right.
It seems unlikely that the Constitution requires states to pay for their citizens’ IVF.
270. 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992).
271. 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
272. Id. (citation omitted).
273. Id. at 1377.
274. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001).
275. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (holding that a husband
cannot veto his wife’s abortion).
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physical integrity is not implicated in the same way, which evens the playing field
for both gamete providers.276
Despite this, the Torres court was unsure about whether Terrell had a
constitutional right not to procreate even while it recognized that Torres had a
constitutional right to procreate.277 According to the court, it was “unclear whether
there is a constitutional right not to procreate but Husband cites no law to support
such an argument; nor has the Court been able to identify any such citations.” 278 The
court went on to say that neither Torres nor Terrell has a constitutional right to
procreate with each other279 and that, in any event, they waived this right by signing
the disposition agreement that required mutual consent to transfer their preembryos.280 There is no authority given for either of these propositions, 281 and, given
that the Arizona court found the agreement fatally ambiguous,282 it is odd to rely on
that same agreement in this part of the analysis.
One final point is that the composition of the current Supreme Court complicates
the analysis of whether the decisions of gamete providers in pre-embryo dispositions
will be protected as fundamental rights.283 Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor tend to take more liberal stances on these issues whereas Justices Alito,
Gorsuch, Roberts, and Thomas tend to take more conservative views. 284 Recentlyappointed Justice Kavanaugh is also a conservative and was appointed by a
Republican president.285 With five conservative votes, it is unclear if the Court will
extend a substantive due process right to gamete providers. The Court could instead
take a narrow view of substantive due process rights vis-à-vis what is “rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people” or “implicit in the concept of ordered

276. See Brown, supra note 31, at 225 n.323.
277. Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 19.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. As mentioned above, see supra text accompanying note 195, it is not at all clear
that individuals can waive or contract away a fundamental right in this manner, although the
intricacies of unconstitutional conditions doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note.
281. See Dissolution Decree, supra note 93, at 19–20.
282. See supra text accompanying note 138.
283. Due to the limited caseload of the Court and the fact that there is no extant circuit split
on the issue, the likelihood of either the Torres ruling or section 318.03 making it in front of
the Supreme Court in the near future is relatively slim. However, judges in the federal court
system are likely to hear these challenges and are also likely to be guided by a desire to
establish solid precedent and thus avoid being overruled by a higher court. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 39 (2008). To date, there are no federal cases on point.
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liberty.”286 If the Court does so, then, almost by definition, ART cannot be a
historically considered traditional right that is fundamental to our concept of
liberty.287
CONCLUSION
Given the deeply personal nature of pre-embryo disposition decisions, it is very
likely that laws like Arizona’s Torres trial court ruling and section 318.03 could be
challenged on privacy grounds. In addition, these laws are likely vulnerable to equal
protection challenges because they draw distinctions between the procreative rights
of people pregnant by coital means versus those undergoing ART. In contrast,
holdings like the Torres court of appeals are less vulnerable to constitutional
challenges because they focus on the individual interests instead of the policy
interests of the state.
However, even if mandatory donation and implantation are somehow
constitutionally permissible, the Torres trial court ruling and section 318.03 are still
problematic because of the unresolved legal issues they raise. For instance, while
section 318.03 removes parental responsibility from the gamete provider who is not
awarded the pre-embryos, the ruling in Torres does not address what kind of legal
rights and responsibilities Torres and Terrell will retain over any live birth that results
from their pre-embryos. In addition, both laws raise questions as to the status of the
legal pre-embryo. If Arizona is now taking a pre-embryo-as-person approach, then
questions like whether pre-embryos can sue, be sued, or receive inheritances must be
answered. While the Torres court justified its ruling in part on a desire to avoid
creating litigation,288 it is undoubtedly the case that the now opened legal questions
raised by it and section 318.03 will have the opposite effect.
In addition to legal issues, cryopreservation is a useful procedure, use of which
Arizona’s recent laws could chill. Not only is IVF invasive and painful, but it is
expensive.289 At the same time, transferring multiple pre-embryos can be dangerous
and lead to multiple pregnancies, which many patients, doctors, and states have
recognized as problematic.290 As a result, Arizona law currently presents patients
seeking IVF in Arizona with tough choices that could affect their health.

286. See supra text accompanying notes 192–93; see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
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Finally, these laws run the serious risk of denying gamete providers access to the
courts. Parties like Torres and Terrell now run the risk of having neither of their
interests met if they adjudicate a pre-embryo dispute. In fact, the Arizona legislature
has explicitly provided that if a predisposition agreement “is brought before the
court” in a divorce proceeding,291 it will not bind the court. This language currently
stands as a warning to Arizona gamete providers not to adjudicate disposition
disputes if they want to retain decision-making authority over disposition decisions.
At the same time, the legislature’s decision is at odds with the statement of both
Torres courts that they should be guided by the contract, if possible.
For these reasons, intended parents in Arizona who are struggling with infertility
should proceed with caution. Arizona is in unsettled territory insofar as pre-embryo
dispositions are concerned, and until the procreative liberty issues raised by forced
donation and implantation are settled, there is a new law in town.
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